Skinner vs Kohn

The Case Against Rewards

In the opening to his book, Kohn writes that: 'The core of pop behaviourism is "Do this and you'll get that."' (p.3). 


He goes onto explain that:

'My premise here is that rewarding people for their compliance is not "the way the world works," as many insist. It is not a fundamental law of human nature. It is but one way of thinking and speaking, of organizing our experience and dealing with others. It may seem rational to us, but it actually reflects a particular ideology that can be questioned.' (p.4)

In addition, by the end of chapter 6, he reiterates his attack of behaviourism:

'The trouble with rewards is not that we hand them out too easily, it is that they are controlling, ultimately ineffective, and likely to undermine intrinsic interest... Giving rewards less frequently or more stringently will not solve the underlying problem, because the problem is behaviorism itself.' (p.116)

The first part of the book is as much an attack on behaviourism as it is a re-evaluation of the nature of rewards. This begs the following questions:

1. To what extent does Kohn satisfactorily dismantle the arguments for behaviourism?
2. To what extent is Kohn right to attack the pop behaviourist idea of "Do this and you'll get that"? 

After all, 'cause and effect' is a way of thinking that is not limited to behaviourism. The notion of 'cause and effect' is at the root of the scientific method, and, as such both the cognitivist and constructivist theories of knowing. 

Skinner Box Reseach. Photography. Encyclopædia Britannica Image Quest. Web. 17 Apr 2012.http://quest.eb.com/images/139_1919716

Free Will

Earlier this year, Sam Harris published a book titled Free Will. You can find a link to an article related to this book in his blog here. 


Harris argues that the notion of free will is an illusion. We might feel that we experience free will, but, in any given situation, ultimately we can only act the way we acted. If his argument is valid, then it follows that all behaviour and action is determined by a complex web of prior cause, both internal and external to us. This is a so-called 'determinist' philosophy. He writes:

'Unconscious neural events determine our thoughts and actions - and are themselves determined by prior causes of which we are subjectively unaware' (Free Will, 2012)

Interestingly, if a determinist philosophy is the logical conclusion of developments in neuroscience and current theories of the mind, this has implications for the behaviourism as espoused by Skinner, and attacked by Kohn. Skinner suggests that uncovering the mental processes are unnecessary as the patterns of cause and effect can (and should) be scientifically witnessed solely through behaviour (behaviour here being used to include acting, thinking and feeling) as manipulated by the environment (the source of the 'causes'). Later theories of knowing such as cognitivism and constructivism also sought to uncover patterns of 'cause and effect', though they seek to so by taking into consideration underlying mental process and social contexts. Harris, it should be noted, is less interested in the mental mechanisms, insomuch that the simple acknowledgement of a mechanism of 'cause and effect', even with purely random and unknowably generated 'causes', is a sufficient springboard for his determinist argument. 

I Am My Connectome

Sebastien Seung's ambitious goal is to map the connections between each neuron in the brain. He calls this web of connections a 'connectome'. Each connectome is unique and is what makes us, us. His ambitious goal is summarised in his Ted talk here. 


Seung's goal to map the connectome belongs to a materialist tradition. Materialism is the theory that states that physical matter is reality, and that everything, including consciousness, thoughts and feelings, can be explained in terms of physical phenomena. This is usually contrasted with a dualist philosophy. As Descartes famously put it 'Cogito, ergo sum' (I think, therefore, I am). He separates mind from body, or, more precisely, brain. A facetious (blogging?) materialist might retort to a Descartes-quoting dualist with 'I am, therefore, I think'. There is no division between body and mind here - the mind stems from physical phenomena. 

Connectome + Determinism = X

If Seung's proposition is valid, if we are our 'connectomes' then this supports a materialist philosophy. If Harris' proposition is valid, if free will is an illusion, then this supports a determinist philosophy. Taken together, they provide an interesting new take on Skinner's behaviourism. If body and mind are one, then the mind is inevitably witnessed through behaviours. Aren't, then, Skinner's maligned 'automatons' revised and brought back to life? What implications does this have for Kohn's critique of pop behaviourism? Does it affect his points about the nature of rewards? 

Book Group Prompts

1) To what extent does Kohn answer the following questions:

• Why do rewards punish?

• Why do rewards rupture relationships?

• Why do rewards ignore reasons?

• Why do rewards discourage risk-taking?

• Why do rewards lessen interest?

2) Do you agree with Kohn's argument that manipulation or seeking compliance is inevitably morally wrong?
3) Is Kohn right to be attacking behaviourism rather than rewards?
4) What are the implications of the first part of the book for teachers? What, if anything, might you do differently?
5) What implications does this book hold for assessment?
6) To what extent does Kohn satisfactorily dismantle the arguments for behaviourism?
7) To what extent is Kohn right to attack the pop behaviourist idea of "Do this and you'll get that"?